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ON MASS ARMIES IN MODERN WAR

Col A. IOVLEV

CPYRGHT

Soviet military doctrine teaches that a modern war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will be nuclear. In connection with this war will both begin differently and be waged in a different manner. This gives rise to the question, are large armies now required or will modern technology make it possible to decide the outcome of the war with small armed forces?

The question of mass armies in a modern war has great political and military significance. It is appropriate to note that in considering the question leaders of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) crudely distort Marxism-Leninism. They do not take into consideration the natural role of fundamental changes in the military-technical means of waging war. Underestimating the destructive and ruinous power of nuclear weapons and in this connection not understanding the character and peculiarities of modern war, they characterize the role of mass armies in it incorrectly.

The Chinese leaders declare that the CPSU and other communist parties are supposedly incorrectly attaching such great significance to the struggle for peace, to the averting of a thermonuclear war and to the problem of nuclear weapons themselves, that the CPSU is supposedly influenced by the incorrect theory of the "omnipotence of arms." The CCP leaders consider that "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger," it is "not in the least frightful," and the question of the inevitable enormous sacrifices which humanity will incur in a world war for the elimination of imperialism, in their opinion, is a secondary matter.

Dogmatically interpreting the Marxist thesis on the relationship of man and technology the CCP leaders are opposing national masses to weapons and military technology, separating one from the other and obviously exaggerating the importance of the quantity of manpower. They are deliberately ignoring the instruction of V. I. Lenin that "the very best army and people most devoted to the cause of the revolution will immediately be destroyed by an enemy if they will not be sufficiently armed, supplied with rations, and trained. This is so very clear that it does not require elucidation." (Works, Vol. 27, p 54)

In order to reply correctly to the question of the importance of mass armies in modern war, it is necessary to approach it concretely and historically, and to consider the general regularity of the quantitative development of armies and factors determining their qualitative peculiarities.

The introduction of armies as weapons of war is connected with the division of society into classes and the formation of the state. With the growth of the productive forces and the change of production relationships there was a change in the character and methods of waging war, and together with this there were changes in the army, the forms of its organization, the principles of providing personnel, numerical composition, etc. With the development of capitalism in place of the comparatively small mercenary forces of the feudal era there appeared large cadre armies, formed in almost all capitalist countries on the basis of universal military service. Pointing to the tremendous growth of armies under capitalism and the increasing expenditures for their maintenance, F. Engels as far back as the 70's of the past century wrote that "the army has become the main purpose of the state and has become an end in itself; nations exist only in order to supply and feed soldiers. Militarism dominates Europe and is devouring it." (F. Engels, Anti-Duering, Gospolitizdat, 1950, p 159)

In the age of imperialism with the extremely intensified struggle for the division and redivision of the world and for colonies the further militarization of all capitalist countries is taking place. This circumstance has led to an unprecedented armament race, to the development of all types of military technology and to a tremendous increase in armies during wars.

In the article, "The Fall of Port Arthur," V. I. Lenin pointed out that wars in the age of imperialism draw into their orbit masses of people. "The times when wars were waged by mercenaries or representatives of castes semidetached from the people have disappeared irretrievably into oblivion. Wars are now waged by nations...." (Works, Vol. 8, p 34)

To the extent that the matter involved the conquest of world supremacy by one or the other of the major imperialist powers or coalitions of countries the struggle waged was long and persistent, drawing into its orbit scores of nations and hundreds of millions of people. Thus, in World War I 36 nations took part and 70 million people were mobilized. In World War II there were already 61 nations fighting and more than 110 million men were mobilized.

The experience of the history of wars shows convincingly that the intensification of aggravations between nations, especially in the age of imperialism, the development of economic capabilities of nations and

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the increase in the production of armament as well as the expanded scale and changing character of wars inevitably led to increases of personnel in armies and to the creation of mass multimillion armies during wartime.

At first glance it would seem that in the 20th century the appearance of new military equipment and armament, increasing by many times the firepower of troops and replacing the firepower of tens and hundreds of soldiers armed with old weapons, should have led to a reduction in the number of personnel in an army. However, in practice the appearance of new armament has not only not led to a reduction in the quantity of armed forces, but, on the contrary, has been accompanied in each case by their increase.

The appearance of rapid-firing artillery, mortars and automatic rifle weapons resulted in great losses of manpower the replacement of which necessitated the creation of large reserves and an over-all increase in military draft quotas. In addition to this, in connection with the appearance of such weapons there was an unprecedented expenditure of ammunition. All of this led to the increase of rear service units supporting the troops, to an increase in transportation and communications equipment and artillery maintenance personnel, and to an increase in the number of personnel in engineer troop units for the construction of defensive installations. Special artillery units were created for fighting against enemy artillery. The control apparatus of troops increased significantly. As a result there was an over-all increase in the number of personnel in the armies of the belligerents.

The entry into the armament on a mass scale of tanks and aviation led to an even more significant growth of armies. New major arms of the service made their appearance -- tanks and aviation. In armies there emerged new staffs and administrations with their supporting units. The quantity of military-technical personnel for the repair and servicing of tanks and airplanes increased sharply. There was a requirement for hangars, air depots and airfields, the servicing and security of which was accomplished by special units. There was a significant increase in rear service units since tanks and airplanes expend tremendous quantities of ammunition and fuels and lubricants. In order to have an approximate idea of the growth in the number of army personnel connected with the development of aviation and tanks for their combat employment and servicing, presentation of the following data should suffice. During the period 1941-1944 the main countries participating in World War II had an annual average production as follows: approximately 130,000 airplanes and more than 91,000 tanks.¹ In 1944 combat equipment and personnel in the US Air Force increased to 80,000 airplanes and 2,411,294 men.²

The appearance in the armament of tanks and airplanes, powerful means of inflicting destruction and losses, resulted in a significant increase in manpower losses in the armies of belligerents. At the same time maneuverability increased greatly and the great losses of personnel combined with the mobile character of the war required the creation of more powerful strategic and operational-technical reserves, which in the final analysis resulted in a significant increase of army manpower. Further, the appearance of tank troops gave rise to antitank artillery of which there emerged not only podrazdeleniya and chasty, but also soyedineniya. Also, their quantity continued to increase along with the increase of tank troops.

The development of aviation called into being antiaircraft artillery, radar and other special units. The development of engineer and signal troops was strongly emphasized. A special branch of service for protection against chemical attack was originated.

But the new service branches appearing on both sides did not and could not reduce the requirement for infantry which numerically composed the basic mass of troops and shouldered the main burden of the armed struggle.

And so the appearance of each new and more powerful weapon or military equipment, as has already been stated, led to an increase of personnel losses in armies, the creation of large reserves, and also to the organization of new arms and branches of the armed forces, new staffs and administrations, security and service units for military equipment, airfields, supply depots, etc., to the increase of reserves and in the final analysis to an over-all increase of the army.

In such manner the growth of manpower in armies, as history shows, is an objective law of armed struggle. However, bourgeois military theoreticians and historians of imperialist nations have tried more than once to refute this indisputable historical fact. They have developed various theories on the replacement of people with machines and on the creation of small highly mechanized armies, underestimating the objective laws of war.

The unsoundness of theories of small mechanized armies in a political and military-scientific relationship was convincingly demonstrated by the experience of World War II in which, despite the extensive employment of new and powerful military technology, mass armies considerably greater than in World War I took part.

After World War II even Fuller, military theoretician of the English bourgeoisie who for many years advocated the theory of small mechanized armies, shamefacedly acknowledged the erroneousness of his views on this question. In his book World War II Fuller wrote that in the event of war in Russia a large army was necessary.

For waging a modern war it is necessary to have all branches and services of the armed forces as well as mass armed forces. And this opinion has held complete sway, especially since the US monopoly on nuclear weapons was put to an end and in regard to rocket technology the USSR surpassed the US.

There is no doubt that mechanization and automation of the armed forces influence the numerical composition of an army and lead to a redistribution of forces between front and rear units, between the number of personnel directly engaged in combat and the number of service units. The relationship between the operational components of units and their technical personnel is also changed.

However, the effect of automation in regard to the numerical composition of an army is contradictory. On the one hand, automation of combat equipment and processes of control of weapons and troops promotes a reduction in personnel, officers and enlisted men, and on the other -- the installation of automatic devices and maintaining them in working condition require new personnel complements. The quantity of staff operational workers is reduced, but there is an increase in the number of officers -- engineers and technicians, servicing the machines. The same thing applies to combat vehicles. Automation leads to a reduction in the quantity of personnel in combat vehicles. In a tank or airplane, for example, with automation the vehicle can be operated by two or three men instead of four or five. The crews of combat vehicles are reduced, but the quantity of the vehicles themselves increases which leads to an increase of personnel for servicing, maintaining and preparing automated combat equipment.

In such matters, based on the automation of combat means and the processes of combat control, although there does arise the tendency for reduction of personnel in an army, it cannot become dominant. Its effect is surpassed by the increasing scale of the armed struggle and the rapid development of technology which lead to an increase in the number of troops from war to war and to the necessity for mass multimillion armies.

What factors give rise to employment of mass armies in a rocket-nuclear war?

To answer this question correctly and to substantiate the necessity for large armies can be done only by considering the character and peculiarities of a contemporary world war.

Not excepting the possibility of wars between imperialist countries, we clearly realize that the most probable war under present conditions is the war which the imperialists are preparing against the USSR and the entire socialist camp, that is to say, the war between two opposing systems -- the socialist system and the capitalist system.

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Preparing the war against socialist countries, the imperialists beforehand created aggressive alignments: NATO, SEATO, SENTO and others, uniting approximately 30 nations. Recently the US imperialists have been preparing for the creation of a new aggressive bloc -- NEATO³ in which it is proposed to include Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

In such manner, if a new world war breaks out it will be a coalition war, a war between two of the largest groupings of countries of the socialist and imperialist camps. It will draw within its orbit a majority of the nations in the world and a huge quantity of the population.

With each world war the number of belligerent nations has increased, and there has been a corresponding growth in the quantity of people participating in the war. Thus, in World War I 62 percent of the entire world population was involved and in World War II -- 80 percent. At the present time under peaceful conditions the US has concluded pacts with 42 countries and has its troops stationed on the territory of the majority of them. According to foreign press data the US maintains 1,400 various military bases and airfields in 36 nations. On these bases there are located approximately one million officers and soldiers. In case of war the quantity of troops at these bases and airfields will be increased significantly. There is sufficient basis to surmise that in a third world war, being prepared by the imperialists, an even greater quantity of countries and population will be involved.

Even now, in peacetime, in Europe alone the military command of the North Atlantic bloc has at its disposal more than 50 divisions. In addition to this the European countries which are members of NATO have more than 30 divisions under national control. In the US Army there are about three million servicemen under arms, in France approximately 700,000, in England more than 450,000 and in West Germany almost 500,000 men. Moreover, West Germany, which according to the agreement with NATO countries is authorized to have an army of 500,000 men, in August 1960 in a "memorandum" of generals demanded the introduction of universal military training and the creation of an army of one million men to be armed with rocket-nuclear weapons. At the present time, according to the press, a concrete plan has been developed in West Germany to increase the Bundeswehr to 700,000 men plus 800,000 trained reservists.

The Franco-West German cooperation agreement concluded on 22 January 1963 in the Elysee Palace in Paris is a continuation of the vicious and dangerous course of the imperialist powers in the conversion of the West German military machine into a shock force of imperialism. This agreement, setting up a militaristic "Bonn-Paris axis," gives West German militarism a "green light" for accelerating rearmament, building up the army and equipping it with nuclear weapons. US imperialists,

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striving for the realization of their reactionary objectives by means of war, not only are not thinking of reducing the armed forces, but, on the contrary, are continuing to arm themselves even more.

Desiring to prevent the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, imperialists of NATO countries began to increase their armed forces even more. In the summer of 1962 according to the estimates of observers and the statements of military command representatives of the Western nations the over-all number of armed forces of NATO countries was more than six million men of which 3.5 million were in the ground forces, 1.5 million in the air forces and more than one million in the naval forces.

"State-monopolist capitalisms," it is stated in the new CPSU Program, "is intensifying militarism to an unheard of degree. Imperialist nations are maintaining huge armed forces even in peacetime."

Rocket-nuclear war between the camps of socialism and capitalism, if the imperialists unleash it, will bear a distinct class character, will be decided by armed conflict, will be exceptionally violent and will pursue decisive political and military objectives. Each of the sides will strive to rout completely the enemy coalition. In his concluding remarks at the 22d CPSU Congress, N. S. Khrushchev stated, "The imperialists of the United States, England, France and West Germany are preparing to wipe out not only socialist conquests, but also the people of our countries."

The cruel, decisive and destructive character of contemporary war will result in huge sacrifices. If World War I cost mankind 10 million killed, 20 million maimed and approximately 10 million dead from war induced epidemics and hunger, and in World War II the number killed and those who died from wounds alone consisted of 32 million persons, then World War III with the use of nuclear weapons will result in countless greater losses both in the army and especially among the civilian population. Linus Pauling, a prominent US scientist, in his book No More War! estimated the number of possible victims of a nuclear war at 800 million persons. The necessity of replacing the tremendous losses in the army and the increasing role of the reserves will inevitably lead to an increase in the armies of the coalitions opposing one another.

A peculiarity of rocket-nuclear war is also its tremendous spatial range. Combat operations in World War I were conducted in an area of over four million square kilometers, and in World War II -- in an area of over 22 million square kilometers. In a future world war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, combat operations will be spread out over a significantly greater territory and war will assume an intercontinental scope since nuclear weapons are practically unlimited in

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range. Combat operations will cover not only Europe and Asia, but also America and Africa, all continents, seas and oceans. The territory of each country drawn into the war will be converted into an arena of military operations. At the fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N. S. Khrushchev stated, "Now, if war begins, military operations will develop differently since nations will have the means for delivering weapons thousands of kilometers. The war will begin primarily in the depth of the belligerent countries and in the process there will not be one capital, not one major industrial or administrative center, or any strategic area which will not be subjected to attack and not only in the first days, but even in the first minutes of the war."

The tremendous spatial range of a future world war is connected also with necessity for guarding and defending interior objectives located in the depth of a country, with great movements of masses of people, armament and other material of war between nations distant from one another belonging to a military coalition.

Further, although with rocket-nuclear armament the significance of the first blow in the outcome of the entire war is increasing immeasurably and the concept of "first blow" in contemporary warfare differs radically from such a concept in past wars, nevertheless it should be pointed out that even with present-day military technology and weapons it is hardly possible to count on winning a world war with one blow. Even now, complete victory is won by difficult and strenuous fighting.

The well-known bourgeois theoretician, Professor Miksche, in his book Atomic War Will Not Take Place observes that the atomic strategy of the North Atlantic bloc, dictated to it by the Pentagon, suffered complete failure from the moment when it became evident that the atomic superiority of the US was an illusion and a myth, and when "nuclear parity" was established. For this reason he advises NATO strategists to reinforce conventional armed forces and create large armies.

Refuting the viewpoint of theoreticians asserting that war supposedly could be won completely with one blow, at the fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet N. S. Khrushchev stated: "But would it really be possible for the attacking side, even if we assumed for a moment that it succeeded in delivering a surprise attack, to knock out of action all at once all reserves of nuclear weapons and all rocket equipment installations on the territory of the nation subjected to the attack? Of course not. The state being subjected to a surprise attack, if, of course, the question concerns a sufficiently large state, will always have the capability of properly repulsing the aggressor." And this means that, acknowledging the tremendous significance of the first rocket-nuclear blow and not denying the possibility of a short-lived war, we must be ready in the event that a decisive armed struggle "can be dragged out and require the prolonged and maximum efforts of all

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And a stubborn and intense struggle will result in a large expenditure of manpower. From this it follows that war requires a great quantity of troops.

In such manner, the resoluteness of the political objectives of a war, its coalition character, huge losses of military personnel, broad spatial range, and the factors of maneuverability, difficulty and persistence, as we see, inevitably lead to the formation of the mass, multimillion armies.

A peculiarity of modern war consists of the fact that nuclear weapons are the decisive means of defeat. They are capable of destroying an enemy's military potential and his strategic means of fighting and of disorganizing military and government control as well as the entire rear area. But for complete victory in war, this is insufficient. In order to gain it, it is necessary to complete the rout of remaining and resisting formations of enemy armed forces and to occupy important strategic areas on enemy territory. At the same time, it is necessary to hold firmly one's own key strategic areas, to keep enemy troops from capturing the territory of one's own and allied nations, to repel enemy attempts to make naval and airborne landings in various regions and to provide for the security of one's own country from missile and air attacks. This can be achieved only as the result of combined operations of all branches of the armed forces which are at present qualitatively different.

The missions and combat capabilities of ground troops in modern warfare have greatly increased. Operational tactical-type rocket troops armed with nuclear weapons are now their main force. The ground forces are capable of waging active combat operations at extremely high tempos to a great depth. The role of tank troops has also increased. All of this is well-known. However, the over-all quantity of ground troops has changed because, in the first place, they now include rocket chasti and soyedineniya and numerous units servicing them. In the second place, as we have already noted, the dispersal of rear service agencies for the purpose of reducing their vulnerability to atomic attacks requires a considerable quantity of personnel for servicing and securing numerous rear service units and installations.

The navy will play an important role in the war. And if the over-all importance of the surface fleet has been reduced, then the importance of the submarine fleet, and especially so being equipped with atomic engines and armed with missiles, has greatly increased.

A great role in modern warfare will be played by the air forces which are capable of carrying out both strategic and operational tactical-type missions.

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It is especially important to emphasize the increasing role of air defense troops. The more bombers and missiles there are on the one side, then the greater need there will be for air defense units on the other. The size of the manpower reserve required for the organization of a modern air defense system can be judged by the fact that in the US in 1956, the strength of the ground observation corps alone reached 360,000 men.⁴

Airborne troops will be very important in modern warfare. In a short period of time, it will be possible to land tens of thousands of airborne troops for the capture of strategic type objectives and for the accomplishment of operational-tactical missions, as well as for the destruction of major enemy landing forces. Considering the mobile character of war, military transport aviation will be used to a great extent for the transportation of both personnel and supplies.

In such manner for complete victory over a strong enemy in modern warfare besides rocket troops it is necessary to have all branches of the armed forces both technically well equipped and in sufficient quantities and this means that large mass armies will be necessary.

It should not be forgotten that every potential enemy is striving, even in peaceful conditions, to achieve superiority in a new weapon, significantly increasing its quantity. The economic possibilities in this regard in both coalitions are great. And we are witnesses of the production race for nuclear missile armament in the US at the present time. All of this has a direct bearing on the question of modern mass armies.

The former army Chief of Staff and presently Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General M. Taylor, in his report published back in September 1957 in the journal Army Information Digest, as applied to the US Army argued the necessity for the availability of large armies, even with weapons of mass destruction, in the following manner: "It should be noted that despite the reduction in the number of divisions the over-all personnel requirement of the ground forces has not been reduced. This is explained by a number of reasons. First, in place of units removed from the composition of divisions of the old organizations, it is necessary to form new antiaircraft artillery, artillery, armored and motor transport units which will be at the disposal of the superior command. Second, new complex armament makes it necessary to provide additional forces to service it. Third, the dispersion of logistics agencies for the purpose of reducing their vulnerability from atomic attacks requires a great quantity of personnel for servicing the small but numerous logistics units and installations. Finally, personnel who are surplus as a result of the reorganization of divisions are being used for manning newly formed guided and unguided missile groups."

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In such manner, the appearance of weapons of mass destruction in modern warfare leads to the increase of armed forces and requires multi-million armies both as a result of the fact that the employment of nuclear weapons will add to warfare tremendous sweep and character of maneuver and make it difficult, intense, destructive, and result in great losses which in turn means the creation of large reserves, as well as a result of the fact that new formations for the combat employment and servicing of new weapons and military equipment will be necessary. At the same time, the old branches of the armed forces, technically re-equipped, are changing qualitatively and are being used on a broad scale.

Present-day reality and the practice of military organization convincingly show that in a world war, which the imperialists are preparing, multimillion armies will take part. At the 22d Congress Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Minister of Defense USSR, stated: "In modern conditions a future world war will be fought despite the huge losses, by mass multimillion armed forces." Already at the present time under conditions when the imperialists are only making preparations for war, "over 20 million inhabitants of our planet are serving in the armed forces" -- declared N. S. Khrushchev in a speech at the International Congress for Universal Disarmament and Peace.

However, a simple numerical superiority or an overwhelming quantity of manpower in itself cannot yet serve as a reliable factor for success in modern warfare. These massive forces must be equipped with mass, varied and powerful equipment and trained to use it skillfully in military operations.

It should be emphasized that proceeding from its peaceful policy, the Soviet Government has repeatedly proposed to Western nations the implementation of complete disarmament, but up to the present time this proposal, for all sorts of pretexts, has not been accepted. The imperialists, disregarding the views of their people who are yearning for peace and repudiating the armament race, are not proceeding toward acceptance of this peaceable proposal of the Soviet Government. Taking this circumstance into consideration and also the fact that the war, if the imperialists unleash it, will require the creation of mass multi-million armed forces, we are forced to concern ourselves in good time about the creation of reserves who are trained in accordance with the demands of modern warfare.

The creation of mass armies during modern war requires a great number of officers, the proportionate number of which in the over-all troop strength is constantly increasing along with the complexity of military equipment. During World War I in the armies of the largest nations there was one officer for every 14-19 soldiers and sergeants, and at the present time there is one officer for every 9-11 soldiers and

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sergeants. With the continuing complexity of military equipment, the proportion of officers, especially engineering and technical officers, will be increased even more. Therefore, in peacetime, in all armies, there are being accumulated trained cadres of reserve officers of various specialties, and officers who have long ago transferred to the reserves are being retrained in accordance with the requirements of the application of new means of combat and, in the first instance, of all classes of rockets. More engineers and technicians in electronics, radar and rocket technology are being trained in civilian educational institutions because in wartime conditions they will be an important reserve of military-technical cadres.

Understanding of the character and peculiarities of modern warfare and knowledge of the regularities of development of the armed forces under conditions of rocket-nuclear armament make it possible for the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to correctly solve problems of military organization and to maintain the constantly high combat capabilities and combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces.

NOTES:

1. A. Lagovskiy. Strategiya i Ekonomika (Strategy and Economics). Voenizdat, 1961, p 22.
2. P. V. Sokolov. Voyna i Lyudskiye Resursy (War and Personnel Resources). Voenizdat, 1961, p 22.
3. NEATO -- Northeast Asia Treaty Organization.
4. P. V. Sokolov. Voyna i Lyudskiye Resursy (War and Personnel Resources), p 23.

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CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC THEORY ON THE GOALS
AND MISSIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT

Maj Gen V. KRUCHININ

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Modern means of armed conflict, especially nuclear and rocket weapons, jet aircraft, radioelectronic equipment, and atomic powered, nuclear-rocket armed submarines, are continuing to be developed in an intensive manner. Further mechanization of the arms of service is also taking place. This introduces serious changes into the combat capabilities of the branches of armed forces and into the contents of the strategic missions they are to perform, and visibly changes the course of achieving strategic goals.

The appearance of space vehicles and the persistent efforts of the US militarists to use space for military goals brings out the problem of combat in space. To our way of thinking, science does not exclude the possibility of developing basically new types of weapons, for example, similar to the "lasers" mentioned in the foreign press for the destruction of various targets and for the accomplishment of other missions in the interest of armed conflict.

Contemporary nuclear weapons, having appropriate types of carriers, charges of great destructive power and possessing specific destructive factors, are capable of traversing virtually limitless space. Through their use it is possible to carry out major strategic missions in extremely short periods of time. However, despite the heretofore unheard of destructive power of the rocket and nuclear weapons, the final victory in a war against a strong, unfriendly coalition is possible only as a result of the combined efforts of all branches of armed forces.

The determination of the strategic goals and missions for the strategic groups of armed forces and for the armed forces as a whole, is usually based on concrete military political goals which are based on the appropriate periods of the war. What enters into the understanding of strategic goals and strategic missions and what are its contents under contemporary conditions?

It seems to us that by strategic goals, we should understand that goal whose attainment by the armed forces during the course of an armed conflict will result in basic changes in the strategic and the military-political situation, and will have an effect on the entire subsequent course of the armed conflict as a whole.

The attainment of strategic goals may be the content of the entire period of the war, while in it are the contents of strategic operations conducted on continental and oceanic theaters of combat operations by strategic groups of armed forces. In a number of cases particularly with the initiation of combat operations, however, the attainment of strategic goals will be accomplished in relatively shorter periods of time.

Modern armed forces locked in conflict with a strong enemy are capable of attaining various strategic goals. The following can be considered examples: the frustration of a surprise enemy attack by effectively repelling massive nuclear strikes and carrying out a rapid retaliatory strike against the most important aggressor targets, the withdrawal from the war of one or several countries of the unfriendly aggressor bloc, the disorganization of the enemy's deep rear area, the destruction of his strategic groups of armed forces on the continental and oceanic theaters of military operations, and others.

The attainment of concrete strategic goals by the armed forces may be ensured by executing appropriate strategic missions simultaneously or successively. In other words, the strategic goal may be divided into component parts, each of which is an independent strategic mission.

The contents of the strategic mission may be the destruction or suppression of groupings of enemy armed forces, the destruction of his most important targets, the occupation of specific areas resulting in the creation of favorable conditions in the strategic situation for a subsequent expansion of military activity and the solution of subsequent strategic missions.

The solution of a strategic mission is usually accomplished by a grouping consisting of one of the branches of armed forces in operational coordination with the other branches of armed forces within a given strategic grouping. In a number of cases the execution of the strategic missions will be possible only by appropriate groupings consisting of two or more branches of armed forces.

In our opinion, the difference between a strategic mission and strategic goal lies in the fact that the execution of a strategic mission brings about a change only in the strategic situation along a given line and does not have a decisive effect upon the entire course of the armed conflict, while the achievement of a strategic goal, which is usually linked with the attainment of a particular military political goal, will result in a sharp turning point in the course of military operations which will exert a substantive effect on the course of the war as a whole.

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and will depend upon the concrete conditions of the strategic situation. A full and deep analysis of the military political conditions during the corresponding period of the war will always permit a well founded and purposeful determination of the concrete strategic goals and missions for the armed forces as a whole, as well as for individual strategic groupings.

Prior to examining the strategic goals and missions which may be executed by the armed forces during the course of contemporary armed conflict, it would be expedient to briefly examine the most substantive changes in their contents which have occurred during the current century.

During World War I the strategic missions were executed primarily by the efforts of the ground troops. The most typical objectives of armed action were the opposing enemy groups, as well as those targets lying close to the front lines whose capture by the ground troops created favorable strategic conditions for subsequent operations. Actions of the qualitatively and numerically weak air forces and fleet operations along the coastal areas, as a rule only assisted the ground forces in the execution of strategic missions for the destruction of enemy groupings and territorial occupation. However, fleet operations by the warring powers in the struggle for the enemy's lines of naval communications had a relatively independent strategic significance.

During the years of the civil war, the missions levied upon the Red Army were not only those of destroying the interventionists and the internal counterrevolution, but also those of maintaining and capturing the basic sources of raw material, bread, and fuel without which the young Soviet Republic could not exist.

World War II, as a result of a significant development in the qualitative characteristics of the various means of armed conflict and their sharp quantitative increase, introduced significant corrections into the strategic capabilities of the armed forces. During the course of the war this was also facilitated by the development of such new forms of combat equipment as radar stations, flying bombs, rocket artillery and others. Improvements in the quality and increases in the quantity of combat equipment permitted not only a significant expansion in the spatial boundaries, but also an increase in the efficiency of one or another branch of armed forces and of the means for armed conflict against the military and rear area targets of the warring nations. The effect of such actions now, at times, began to bring about strategic results. With this, the strategic missions during World War II consisted primarily in the destruction of opposing enemy groupings of armed forces and the seizure of important targets and areas in which they were located.

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The motorization of troops, the wide-scale employment of heavy and long-range artillery and armored equipment, and improvements in aircraft of all types and in ships of all classes, facilitated an increase in troop maneuverability, an increase in the tempos and depth for the ground operations, and an acceleration in combat operations at sea, and consequently, decreased the time necessary for the execution of strategic missions which are more complex in content.

It is sufficient to say in support of what has been said, that in the major strategic offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, from one-fifth to one-third of all enemy ground forces operating on the Soviet-German Front were destroyed. As an example, in the battle for the Volga, 50 divisions, which equalled 20 percent of all divisions operating at that time on the Soviet-German front, were destroyed; in the Belorussian operation, 76 divisions, or 32 percent were destroyed; in the Vistula-Oder operation, 60 divisions or 33 percent were destroyed.

Simultaneously with the destruction of the major enemy strategic groupings our Armed Forces occupied important areas and targets, forced the Hitlerite allies out of the war, and gave realistic assistance in the liberation of the peoples of southern and southeastern Europe.

During the Great Patriotic War the scale of strategic operations reached 1,000 kilometers of front and 700 kilometers in depth.

The employment of airborne troops and the wide use of amphibious landings during World War II ensured the execution of a series of strategic missions which were new for that time. Operational examples of such missions were the Crete airborne operation by the German troops in May 1941, the Kerch-Feodosiya amphibious operation by the troops of the Caucasus Front and the Black Sea Fleet in December 1941, the airborne operations of the Anglo-American troops in Sicily in July 1943 and in Normandy in June and July of 1944, and the Kurile amphibious operations of the troops of the Second Far East Front and the Pacific Fleet in August 1945.

Regarding content, the strategic missions during World War II were far more significant than in the past, and their execution required massive employment of various forces and means of combat.

The contemporary means of massive destruction and their carriers are capable of conducting strategic missions and operating against enemy targets under any conditions and on all continents and military theaters. They have opened up a new era in the development and building of armed forces, have fundamentally changed; their capabilities in armed conflict, and force a different approach toward the examination of the question on attaining strategic goals.

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by executing a specific number of various strategic missions. Subsequently, all discussions pertaining to the preparation of the conduct of military activities for the attainment of strategic goals will have a common theoretical background issuing from the execution of one strategic mission.

In the execution of a strategic mission, an armed forces grouping usually operates in a specific manner employing the appropriate forms of military activities which support the most efficient execution of the mission with a minimum expenditure in effort and time. It is difficult to examine in one article the concrete methods and forms of activities of strategic armed forces groupings which differ in composition in one or another strategic situation because of the number of possible variants in such a situation. The selection of the methods and forms of activity is a creative process based on the careful analysis of the varying factors in a situation and the generalization of the practice of armed conflict.

In the interests of executing strategic missions, the various command levels, control organs, and troops will carry out a whole series of comprehensive measures. Let us examine some of them in the most general terms.

The composition and grouping of friendly forces and means necessary for the execution of an assigned mission are determined in the process of formulating the strategic mission on the basis of a complete evaluation of the conditions of the situation and in selecting for destruction the most important targets and also the enemy armed forces groupings in a given theater of military operations or in concrete strategic lines.

Initial attention is given to the selection of those enemy targets against which strategic nuclear means could be best used. Depending on the features of the strike targets, a selection is made of the nuclear weapons carriers (strategic missiles, missile-armed aircraft, submarines or surface craft) which could best and most rapidly execute the assigned mission with minimum expenditure of explosive power.

It should be mentioned that the execution of a large number of strategic missions, whose basic content is the destruction of important strategic targets in the enemy's deep rear area, is ensured primarily by nuclear missile strikes.

An appropriate grouping of ground troops and air force is used for the final destruction of the enemy forces if they are located on continental theaters of military operations, and naval groupings and long-range missile-carrying aircraft if the enemy is located in naval theaters

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of operation. At the same time the most expedient methods and forms of employing these forces are determined.

Special attention is given to organizing the material, technical and other forms of support for the forces and means which have been selected for executing the strategic mission. These measures are planned beforehand and may be put into operation during the preparatory period, that is prior to the initiation of military operations, or during the course of the operations.

In modern conditions, surprise action is of importance for the successful execution of strategic missions and the subsequent achievement of strategic goals. The concealed execution of all preparatory measures and the deeply planned, active supply of misinformation to the enemy side about the true plans may catch the enemy troops unaware, lower their resistance potential and their effective counteraction, and at the same time ensure the successful execution of the assigned mission.

Surprise actions have a great significance for attainment of success in armed conflict during the course of the war and particularly at the moment of its onset. This is why Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Minister of Defense, mentioned in one of his works, that "once the imperialist aggressors have placed their hopes on a surprise attack, then primary attention must be directed toward ensuring the high combat readiness of the armed forces, and toward strengthening their capabilities to frustrate such an attack regardless of its point of origin, and to completely destroy the enemy." (Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Bditel'no Stoyat' na Strazhe Mira (Stand Vigilantly on Guard of Peace), Voenizdat, 1962, p 27) Further he states that: "High combat readiness is not an abstract but a concrete concept embodied in precise calculations of date and time in hours and minutes which cannot be disrupted without incurring the risk of being destroyed by the enemy before anything can be done." (Ibid., p 42)

Strategic missions are executed by the efforts of the appropriate strategic groupings of armed forces.

As we see it, a strategic grouping should be understood as that grouping of forces and means on a continental or naval theater of military operations or in the deep rear of the country which consists of ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya of branches of armed forces assigned to execute concrete strategic missions.

The execution of strategic missions for the occupation of specific terrain areas in continental theaters of military operations and seizure and holding of enemy targets will require the concealed formation of groupings, primarily ground troops and air forces, well ahead of time.

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Previously, when new strategic missions would arise, a formation of new strategic groupings of armed forces was usually required. There can be no need of this under modern conditions. For example, if a new mission arises for the delivery of rocket nuclear strikes and it will be assigned to the Strategic Rocket Troops chastis which are capable of accomplishing the mission from their fixed positions, then, naturally, there is no need for a regrouping of the rocket-nuclear forces and means.

The composition of the armed forces groupings intended to execute strategic missions may be the most varied and will depend, first of all, upon the concrete requirements of the mission. The latter may be solved by the forces and means of any one branch or several branches of armed forces in operational coordination.

Each branch of armed forces is capable of executing with greatest efficiency those strategic missions which are unique to it.

The Strategic Rocket Troops can destroy enemy strategic nuclear and other means of mass destruction in specific areas, important economic targets in the rear area of the enemy coalition, centers of state control, and important points of armed forces control, and can disrupt enemy communications by the destruction of important centers of the transportation system.

Long-range aviation can execute important strategic missions in coordination with other branches of armed forces, or independently, particularly in the destruction of enemy naval groupings and various strategic targets in continental theaters. In the selection of targets for destruction, the specific features of the air force are considered: the capability of efficient action against enemy mobile and pin-point targets, the delivery of subsequent strikes, the immediate shift of effort against other targets, and the ability to conduct strategic aerial reconnaissance.

Modern military-transport aviation is capable of executing major missions, although they are of a support nature, which under certain conditions assume a strategic significance. Such missions may be the landing of troops, the establishment of rapid maneuvering of forces and means between different theaters of military operations and even continental ones, the delivery of armament and material means to the troops particularly in those instances when the normal functioning of other means of communications have been disrupted or when it is necessary to gain time in an existing situation.

Strategic naval groupings, consisting basically of submarine units and the naval rocket carrying air force, are capable of destroying enemy naval groupings, primarily his strike aircraft carriers and rocket-

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carrying submarines, and destroying the sea and ocean lines of communication of the unfriendly coalition either independently or in coordination with long-range aviation and the Strategic Rocket Troops. In the coastal areas of continental theaters the appropriate fleets may enter into the strategic grouping consisting of several branches of armed forces and participate in the destruction of coastal enemy groupings and the seizure of straits, islands, and other important targets and areas.

The PVO Strany Troops has the most important strategic mission of effectively repelling enemy air force attacks and the in-flight destruction of rockets and space means of attack. The cover for important strategic groupings of armed forces may be independent strategic missions for PVO Strany Troops units.

From the onset of armed conflict the Ground Troops will solve strategic missions on continental theaters in close coordination with other branches of armed forces. In a nuclear war, especially in its initial phase, it is doubtful that the Ground Troops would be able to carry out major strategic missions completely independently without a close tie-in of their activities with units of other branches of armed forces.

The basic content of the strategic missions executed by the Ground Troops is the completion of the destruction of enemy armed forces groupings achieved by nuclear-rocket strikes, the destruction of his surviving means of massive destruction, the seizure of important targets and areas, and the countering of enemy efforts to enter friendly territory.

An important factor influencing the successful execution of strategic missions during armed conflict is the constant availability of various strategic reserves within the armed forces groupings. The need for such reserves is caused by the possibility of sharp and frequent changes in the strategic situation, so characteristic of modern war, which may demand additional efforts through the commitment of a specific part of the reserves. The use of strategic reserves for building up the efforts of the strategic armed forces groupings ensures a change in the relation of forces and means in favor of the friendly side on the appropriate lines of effort and theaters and permits retention of the strategic initiative during the armed conflict.

The composition of the reserves may be most varied and is determined by the specific contents of the strategic missions, the scientifically-based prognosis regarding possible developments during the armed conflict, and those actual capabilities of the Supreme Command. The reserves may consist of units of all branches of armed forces and arms and major control organs of various designation, and may also include reserves of weapons, combat equipment, and material and technical means.

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The dispersal and covered displacement of the reserves, their concealment, especially against enemy aerial and space strikes, and their prompt and purposeful employment will ensure the successful execution of the missions.

The constant replenishment and creation of reserves to replace those expended is one of the most important principles of military strategy and may play a decisive role in the successful execution of missions and the achievement of strategic goals.

As previously mentioned, the most important strategic missions in armed conflict may be executed directly and in a very short time by powerful nuclear-rocket strikes delivered by the Strategic Rocket Troops, long-range aviation, and the rocket-carrying forces of the navy. The execution on continental theaters of military operation of strategic missions which have the purpose of complete destruction of opposing enemy ground troop groupings and the seizure of territory, will, in some instances, require the execution of certain intermediate operational missions.

As we envision it, the execution of such missions is possible when ground troops are within armed forces groupings assigned for this goal and, evidently, will be carried out by the forces of one or several front units within the limits of one or two simultaneously or consecutively conducted operations.

Important conditions for the rapid and successful execution of strategic missions on continental theaters of operations must be the uninterrupted and swift conduct of active measures by the troops following up the massive nuclear-rocket strikes, the capability of the troops to maneuver rapidly along any direction in the theater of military operations, and the uninterrupted replenishment of the operating armed forces groupings with the necessary forces and means. Modern conditions and the expanding development of various types of transport, especially air transport, ensures the possibility of creating such conditions.

The sharp and frequent changes in the situation in theaters of military operations during the execution of strategic missions imposes high requirements on the organs and means of control. Only a constant and comprehensive knowledge of the true situation on the fronts, the prompt supply of information to the appropriate control organs, and the knowledge and consideration of the versatility of enemy actions and his intentions will permit the rapid execution of sound measures, well-founded decisions, and the most purposeful and realistic control of subordinate troops, forces, and means. The achievements in the field of automation, radioelectronic equipment and mathematical research methods ensure a sharp increase in troop mobility and control and the dependable operation of various command and staff levels.

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holding an important place in the system of control during the achievement of strategic goals is the precise organization and the constant maintenance of strategic and operational coordination between the different armed forces groupings ensuring maximum success in armed conflict, especially in those conditions where military operations envelop broad areas of several continental or oceanic theaters of military operations and various continents.

By strategic coordination we understand that coordination in which the efforts of armed forces groupings operating in different directions in a single theater of military operations or in different theaters are united by a single strategic goal and concept. To a lesser degree, these groupings will be linked by the same spatial boundaries as this usually takes place during operational and particularly during tactical coordination.

The basis of strategic coordination under contemporary conditions is the precise coordinated efforts of all branches of armed forces and means of armed conflict not only by goals but by time and place with the operations of the Strategic Rocket Troops executing the most important strategic missions during the war.

The organization of this type of coordination is implemented depending upon the concrete requirements of the appropriate strategic missions assigned for the direct execution by specific armed forces groupings and with a consideration of the general strategic goals. Under contemporary conditions, the coordination of effort by time and place becomes extremely important in view of the sharply increased role of the space and time factors in armed conflict. Confirmation of this can be found in the realistic possibility of the armed forces to execute major strategic missions and achieve strategic goals in the enemy's deep rear, for example, by delivering nuclear-rocket strikes within a very short period of time.

From an analysis of enemy targets having strategic significance it is possible to make conclusions as to the type of nuclear means and their carriers which may be best used in the developed situation for the destruction of these targets. Let us assume that under these conditions it will be necessary to employ strategic ballistic rockets and strategic aviation.

It is completely clear that it is not always possible to deliver simultaneous rocket and air force strikes against enemy targets particularly if these targets are situated in a relatively limited area. Consequently, the division of targets between the rocket troops and the air force and the determination of the time when these strikes are to be delivered are the basic questions in the organization of their strategic coordination.

troop forces, will participate in the achievement of specific strategic goals then it will be necessary to coordinate their activities with those of the rocket troops and air force.

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It should be mentioned that the successful accomplishment of strategic missions, especially by the coordinated efforts of various branches of armed forces and means of armed conflict, as a rule, is based on the precise organization of operational coordination with the forces and means so introduced. The organization of operational coordination will be implemented on the basis of appropriate provisions for strategic coordination in the accomplishment of each specific mission.

In all instances strategic coordination is implemented in the interests of carrying out the mission in the main theater of military operations, while in the given theater it is done in the interests of the armed forces grouping carrying out the main strategic mission.

A purposeful strategic coordination ensures uninterrupted communications between the command and staffs of the different branches of armed forces and strategic groupings and permits them to have full information on the situations in the theaters of military operations.

The efficient execution of strategic missions during armed conflict is possible only if there is a constant consideration given to the radiological situation and massive destruction from nuclear-rocket strikes which, under certain conditions, may seriously impede the strategic groupings in the execution of their missions.

In view of the capability of rocket and nuclear weapons to act against enemy targets located at virtually any depth, new requirements are levied upon the organs and means of strategic reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is faced with the tremendous problem of locating targets in the enemy's deep rear and in maintaining control over the results of friendly nuclear-rocket strikes.

It should be expected that in the struggle for strategic initiative the enemy will be constantly countering and hindering the efforts of the armed forces groupings to execute their strategic missions successfully. He will strive to destroy the rocket and nuclear means of the other side, rout its naval and air force groupings, and the mobile shock groups of ground troops, especially the tanks and basic reserves, and particularly along the most important strategic directions and theaters of military operations. By striking against important communications centers the enemy will attempt to isolate the advancing strategic groupings, and deny the possibilities for bringing up personnel, weapons, combat equipment, and material and technical means.

employment of diversionary and reconnaissance groups in the rear area of the advancing troops, the defensive will strive to disorganize troop control and create conditions which would complicate the efforts of the armed forces promptly and successfully executing the strategic as well as most important operational missions. During the armed conflict, the enemy may be expected to conduct broad misinformation measures, conceal his true designs, and implement camouflage activities which are varied in content and scale. Such enemy measures must be countered by actions which would decrease the effectiveness of these measures and at the same time would ensure the successful execution of friendly missions. Sufficiently complete and factual information from the various types of intelligence on the position and designs of the opposite side would permit the command to take the necessary steps promptly.

The execution of strategic missions and the achievement of strategic goals will frequently cause the command to assign necessary forces and means for consolidating the attained results. This may be particularly so in the seizure of vitally important economic areas and administrative and political centers of countries in the enemy coalition, and in the seizure of islands, archipelagos, straits, and other areas and targets having an important strategic significance.

The complexity of the varying conditions during armed conflict will demand that the command elements at all levels have deep military and political understanding, practical experience in the direction of subordinate troops, and high moral, combat, and organizational qualities necessary for the achievement of success in war over a technically strong enemy.

Victory in war is forged in peacetime. The daily persistent and intensive training of all armed forces personnel in mastering the complex modern combat equipment and the methods of its employment under various conditions, the inculcation of high patriotism, a conscious discipline, and firm and unlimited faith in the righteousness of the cause provides the necessary conditions for the successful execution of all missions, including strategic, in armed conflict.

It is indicated in the resolution of the 23rd Congress CPSU on the report of the Central Committee that one of the most important items on which the attention of our party and people must be concentrated is "to maintain at a proper level and strengthen in every way possible the defense capability of our homeland, the bulwark of peace in the entire world, perfect the armament of the Soviet Army, raise the level of the combat, ideological and political training of the personnel, increase the vigilance of our people, and dependably defend the creative efforts and peaceful life of the Soviet people, the builders of communism...."

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ing to the report of the Central Committee CPSU secretary, comrade L. F. Il'yichev, "On the Immediate Tasks of the Ideological Work of the Party," passed on 21 June in 1963, states that: "in order not to be caught unaware, the Soviet Government is doing and will do everything necessary to further strengthen the defense capability of the country, and to indoctrinate its people, and its glorious armed forces in the spirit of devotion to the socialist Homeland and to the great ideals of communism. It is necessary now and henceforth to increase in every way possible the technical equipping of the army and navy, and improve military mastery, combat readiness and the ideological hardening of the Soviet servicemen, and their readiness to carry out their sacred duty in defense of the Homeland at any time."

The successful execution of these tasks will ensure that in any future war were one unleashed by the imperialist governments, our armed forces will rapidly destroy the armed forces of the aggressor coalition and thus attain the strategic goals in the armed conflict.

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TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE US ARMY

Maj Gen R. SIMONYAN

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Secret warfare and subversive activities have long been raised to the rank of US Government policy, according to the statements not only of colonels and generals, but also of high-ranking government officials. In January 1962, US President Kennedy declared that "secret warfare is a more important element of US foreign policy than nuclear weapons and conventional armed forces."

It is not surprising, therefore, that even in peacetime US intelligence activities have included all countries of the world, not excepting allied countries. With the help of various means, US intelligence is trying to collect various types of information constituting state secrets and to undermine the political and economic stability of those countries which are considered as probable targets of aggression.

The intelligence and subversive activities are to be increased sharply at the outbreak of a war. In this connection, the US military command has given much attention to the further development of facilities and means of tactical intelligence. We may note here that the term "tactical intelligence" in the US Army includes the concept of conducting intelligence activities not only in the interest of combined-arms divisions, but also of formations on army level.

Among the books devoted to intelligence, special attention should be given to a book by Irving Heymont entitled *Takticheskaya Razvedka v Sovremennoy Voyne* [the English title is *Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare*], translated from English, Moscow, 1963. It contains not so much the personal opinions of the author on problems of intelligence in modern warfare, but rather the official opinion accepted in the US Army. The book contains many references to official sources, as well as a large number of diagrams and tables which disclose the present organizational structure of different intelligence organs in the US Army, and the forms of nearly all standard intelligence documents. According to its form, the work by I. Heymont is more like a manual for intelligence than an ordinary book.

The author gives a general evaluation of literature on intelligence matters, stating that: "Not one of the many books on tactical

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Intelligence which were published since World War II, mentioned the great changes in tactics and strategy which were caused by the appearance of new types of weapons and combat equipment" (page 5). The book under review discusses in detail the basic principles in the organization and conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence under conditions of nuclear warfare; it describes the facilities, means, and methods of obtaining intelligence information, the procedures of its processing and utilization, and also determines the methods of organizing the combat training of personnel of intelligence organs and the intelligence training of staffs and troops.

In determining the place of tactical intelligence in the general system of US intelligence, the author states: "In the US, there are two principal types of intelligence: national and military" (page 9). National intelligence includes the intelligence organs of government agencies charged with the preparation and implementation of national policies and with matters of national security. "The data of national intelligence are used by all government agencies in the interest of carrying out a general, uniform national policy, national plans and programs.... Military intelligence is conducted mainly by the intelligence organs of the armed forces. Its data are used for preparing and implementing military policy, military plans and programs" (page 9).

Military intelligence, in accordance with the US breakdown of military art, is subdivided into strategic and tactical intelligence. Strategic intelligence is conducted in the interests of higher organs of the government and high command, while the information received by it provides the basis for the formulation of objectives of national policy and for the implementation of military measures in peacetime and wartime.

The book lists the basic problems of strategic intelligence. These include: "Military geography, transport and communications, social and state systems, economics, science, armed forces, government leaders and command personnel of the army, navy, and air force of foreign countries" (page 9).

Thus, US strategic intelligence is interested in all aspects of the life and activities of a country under investigation.

Tactical intelligence is defined as one of the most important elements of the combat activities of troops, and not as a type of combat support. This idea is clearly expressed throughout the book.

As distinguished from strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence is concerned with a more restricted range of problems and its information is used in the planning of combat operations, as well as in carrying out special measures of logistical support. Tactical intelligence

is charged with obtaining (gathering) information on the combat area and the enemy's capabilities and weak points, mainly to enable commanders to make decisions which would ensure the success of their combat missions. "Without tactical intelligence, no commander would be able to make a correct decision on the use of fire weapons, or to determine the form of a maneuver, and to organize the security of positions or the disposition of troops in the proper manner" (page 10). The author even believes that "the effectiveness of tactics and strategy depends to a great extent on the effectiveness of intelligence" (page 17).

I. Heymont assigns an equally important role to counterintelligence which, in the US Army, is combined with intelligence in one organ. The book describes the activities of counterintelligence, which is aimed at fighting enemy intelligence. The author states: "To prevent the enemy from making effective use of nuclear weapons or other means of mass destruction, it is very important to take prompt steps in combatting his intelligence forces" (page 8). It is stressed that intelligence and counterintelligence measures are conducted simultaneously and are inseparable from one another. The responsibility for planning and supervising counterintelligence rests with the chief of intelligence (page 81). At the same time Heymont admits that all staff officers and commanders actually perform the functions of counterintelligence officers. They consult the chief of intelligence concerning counterintelligence support of troop activities carried out under their supervision.

The book gives a detailed list of all counterintelligence measures in each division-size and army-size formation. They completely include troop security, supervision of the civilian population, organization of a counterintelligence regime in ports, border areas, and en route, military censorship, and special measures aimed against enemy intelligence. It is believed that the success of most counterintelligence operations depends on the ability of personnel to keep military secrets, to use proper camouflage, and to make observations and report the results of their observations.

One of the most important features of US Army intelligence is the strict centralization of different types of intelligence activities in a single organ, i.e., the intelligence section of a combined-arms formation. In addition to performing their specific functions, these organs also organize the collection of information and intelligence data on weather conditions, which are required by commanders on all levels (intelligence sections of corps headquarters and on a higher level); and they coordinate activities for obtaining information on the political situation and the economy of a combat area, especially on an operational level. They carry the joint responsibility for organizing radiological observations and for transmitting prompt reports on the radioactive contamination of an area. The chief of the chemical service is directly in charge of organizing radiological intelligence.

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The intelligence organs of the USSR supervise the receipt, distribution, and storage of topographic maps and, together with the section for operational and combat training, establish the norms of supplying troops with maps.

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In examining the basic principles of intelligence, I. Heymont noted first of all that the new means of armed combat have caused major changes in intelligence requirements and that the methods of conducting intelligence have also changed. At the same time, he stated, the basic principles of intelligence have not changed (page 12).

What are the basic principles of intelligence, in the opinion of the author?

The first principle of intelligence is believed to be the organization of this type of troop activities, according to a definite cycle which includes the following processes: procurement (collection) of information, processing of intelligence data (preparation of reports), distribution and utilization of intelligence reports, and planning and supervision of intelligence operations.

All processes of the intelligence cycle are closely related to one another and are carried out concurrently. However, the development of processes of the above-mentioned cycle does not proceed in the same order as stated by the author. The first step of an intelligence cycle has always been and will continue to be the planning of intelligence and the formulation of assignments for those who perform the tasks. The procurement of intelligence information may take place simultaneously with the planning, but can never precede the planning process, just as a commander's decision always forms the basis for troop operations.

The second principle of intelligence is the clearness of purpose of intelligence operations, i.e., the concentration of major efforts of intelligence on the procurement of information required by a commander, which would enable him to make a correct decision at a certain time.

The third principle of intelligence includes the timeliness of obtaining intelligence information and of reporting it to all interested departments. In this connection it is stressed: "Since the use of nuclear weapons may quickly and radically change the correlation of forces of the combatants, it is particularly important to receive timely reports on probable objectives of nuclear attacks by the enemy and on targets for inflicting nuclear strikes against the enemy" (page 17). The most complete intelligence information loses its value if it is not received by the interested persons at the proper time.

The next principle of intelligence is the fact that it represents one of the elements of combat activities of troops. The author correctly

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pointed out that the combat actions, even of a small unit are evaluated by taking into consideration its activities in the sphere of intelligence (reconnaissance). I. Heymont stated: "To agree that intelligence is a function only of intelligence specialists would be equal to condemning oneself to defeat in battle" (page 17). He believes that staff officers who prepare combat orders, and officers in charge of intelligence, should work in close coordination. All differences of opinion between staff officers in the evaluation of intelligence data should be resolved by the commander.

Among other principles of intelligence, the author mentioned the need to coordinate intelligence tasks with the requirements of the commander who organizes intelligence operations; the planned nature of intelligence operations; the flexibility of organization and secrecy of intelligence operations. In discussing these principles, the author noted that the zone of reconnaissance must in each case exceed the depth and width of a combat zone of a unit by about 50 percent.

In discussing the secrecy of intelligence operations, the author noted that intelligence is most effective only if it is not discovered. In this connection one of the tasks of counterintelligence must be "to prevent enemy intelligence from obtaining information concerning the activities of our intelligence, as well as to prevent the enemy from knowing what kind of information we have" (page 20). At the same time, security measures taken to protect intelligence operations must never create difficulties in the dissemination of intelligence information and in the exchange of this information between various staffs.

These are the basic principles of conducting intelligence operations in the US Army, which according to I. Heymont have remained unchanged. If we judge by their form, they have actually not changed. However, the substance of these principles has changed radically. Let us consider, for example, such a principle as the timeliness of intelligence. It has existed before. However, the increased maneuverability of troops, the dynamic nature and high speed of combat action, and the abrupt, frequent changes in a situation, have resulted in the fact that under current conditions intelligence information becomes outdated much more quickly than in the past. Therefore, the timeliness of collection of intelligence information and its dissemination to the interested departments has acquired a completely new quality. This, in turn, requires a search for new means and methods of speedy collection and processing of intelligence information.

The author believes that the success of intelligence is mainly dependent on careful organization, and particularly on the planning of intelligence operations, without which the information would be neither valuable nor timely.

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The organization of activities involved in the acquisition of intelligence information includes the following measures: outlining of intelligence tasks, determining their priority, selecting the organs which are best capable of carrying out certain tasks, and giving appropriate orders.

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As pointed out in the book, the acquisition of comprehensive and completely accurate information concerning the enemy or the combat area would be extremely rare. First of all, the opponent will always counteract intelligence operations with all the means at his disposal; secondly, the commanders of all units have limited reconnaissance capabilities, and therefore use all of their resources for the reconnaissance of priority targets. In this connection it is important to determine the principal tasks of intelligence which "represent the main direction in the activities of intelligence organs of a division-type or regiment-type formation" (page 69). The author believes that one of the principal tasks of intelligence is the acquisition of intelligence data needed by a commander at a certain time, so that he may make a substantiated decision.

This includes the determination of enemy capabilities (where and with the use of what forces he can undertake certain operations), his weak points, his fighting strength and grouping, and the acquisition of information on the combat area, including natural and artificial obstacles and weather conditions.

Depending on changes in the combat situation and the progress of combat action, the principal tasks of intelligence are also subject to change. The number of such tasks, according to I. Heymont, should ordinarily not exceed three or four, since otherwise the intelligence resources may become too much dispersed.

According to I. Heymont, in determining the type of intelligence information to be obtained it is necessary to proceed from the fact that any combat action must be preceded by certain preliminary activities. Such preliminary activities are, for example, the advance of troops, the occupation or change of firing (launching) positions by rocket units, preparation of supplies, construction work at river crossings, and so forth. An analysis of these preliminary activities, despite their being camouflaged, makes it possible to discover the probable intentions of the enemy. After an analysis of these factors of intelligence, it can be determined what specific information is required in order to carry out basic reconnaissance tasks. For example, if the echeloning of enemy artillery in depth is a factor of intelligence, the collection agencies are given the task of discovering the location, types, and calibers of enemy artillery in the area or zone under consideration. The staff, and particularly the chief of intelligence, but not the collection agency, has to determine whether such a disposition of artillery is a factor of intelligence.

At the same time as the reconnaissance tasks are detailed, the collection agencies for obtaining such intelligence information are selected. In this connection, the author gives a detailed description of all available intelligence facilities and means and the methods of collection used by them. Collection agencies also include technical intelligence detachments, consisting of specially trained personnel of the technical services. The tasks assigned to these detachments include the collection of information on the tactical and technical characteristics of enemy weapons and combat equipment by studying the equipment, arms, and materiel captured from the enemy. They also prepare questionnaires for prisoner-of-war interrogation.

For reconnaissance behind enemy lines, it is recommended to use combat units and subunits, which stay behind in (or are sent to) the enemy rear, or which were encircled in the course of combat action. However, the author believes that the most effective way of operating in the enemy rear is with the help of intelligence agents, army special forces, and guerrillas. "Operating deep in the enemy rear area, where collection agencies can collect information that is particularly valuable for target acquisition" (page 23).

In discussing reconnaissance through combat reconnaissance in force, the author points out, in particular, that it is carried out by a considerable force for the purpose of acquiring or testing information on the enemy grouping, and on his dispositions and strength. However, such reconnaissance may result in heavy losses, disclose the commander's intentions, or may cause combat actions which are not desirable at that particular moment. If the enemy has tactical nuclear weapons, reconnaissance in force may not be expedient, since the reconnaissance group assigned for this purpose would present a profitable target for a nuclear attack, and the heavy losses incurred would not justify the acquisition of the intelligence information.

The author believes that an important condition for the efficient organization of intelligence is comprehensive knowledge concerning the enemy in the combat area. Special attention must be given to knowing the enemy's organization of troops, his combat equipment, tactics, system and methods of rear services support. While the basic principles of warfare remain in effect for all armies, their tactics differ in many respects. Therefore, in determining reconnaissance tasks it is necessary to consider and disclose the peculiar features of the tactical operations of the enemy.

In a nuclear war, says the book, regardless of whether nuclear weapons are used on a restricted or unrestricted scale, intelligence efforts would be directed mainly at designating objectives (targets) for nuclear attacks. A reliable, coordinated intelligence system must be established, which would be capable of prompt detection of fleeting

targets so that they may be quickly neutralized and destroyed, without risking the destruction of one's troops. The principal task of counterintelligence under these conditions would consist in preventing the enemy from obtaining intelligence information on profitable targets for nuclear attacks.

The book stresses the fact that collection agencies must proceed to the designated areas depending on the action of the enemy, and not of their own troops. On the other hand, counterintelligence activities are conducted mainly in coordination with one's own troop operations.

The author points out that regardless of whether the use of any type of weapons is restricted or not, collection agencies must make all possible efforts so that the extension of a limited armed conflict into a general war may not come as a surprise.

In joint combat operations of the armed forces of several allied countries, a close cooperation and coordination of the respective intelligence organs must be organized. The main purpose of this coordination is to avoid duplication of intelligence operations and to utilize the available forces and means of intelligence of allied armies in the most effective manner.

In situations short of war, the operations of intelligence and reconnaissance organs of large formations consist in concentrated efforts to collect intelligence information which would permit timely preparations for the outbreak of hostilities. For this purpose, it is recommended to organize, even in peacetime, a continuous flow of intelligence information to all army units which are to be committed immediately at the outbreak of war.

During peacetime, intelligence organs must acquire maps and aerial photographs of areas where large formations may be located, and of other areas which may be of interest. The author states: "All available sources are used for the collection of intelligence information, including the police, forestry service, traffic control agencies, press organs, and libraries" (page 109).

Counterintelligence activities are an important part of the work of an intelligence chief during peacetime. He is responsible for making security rules for the handling of secret documents and for the security of important installations within the area of a formation or unit.

Intelligence activities of troops are carried out by intelligence organs, intelligence units and subunits, and during combat by the entire personnel of the troops. Therefore, the success of intelligence in

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modern war will be determined to a great extent by the level of intelligence training of the personnel of intelligence organs and the training of the entire unit personnel (page 114). The initial training of US Army personnel in intelligence skills and methods is conducted in intelligence schools which are organized by division headquarters. These schools train the personnel of intelligence organs as well as of regular units and subunits. Each unit, which does not have an intelligence staff section, should send at least one officer and several enlisted men for training in the schools. The graduates of these schools, upon returning to their units, should organize intelligence training for the personnel of these units under the supervision of the intelligence chief. The author believes that as a result of the organization of intelligence schools in divisions, standards for intelligence skills and methods are established in each unit.

It is recommended that the training in intelligence schools be followed by conducting command post exercises with the use of all communications facilities. The main purpose of these exercises is to provide an opportunity for the trainees to acquire practical skills in the work of intelligence organs in the field, under conditions which are as similar as possible to actual combat conditions.

Intelligence training for all personnel of a unit is conducted within the general system of combat training and, at the same time, it has a specialized character. All personnel of a division-size unit must be trained in basic methods of collecting and prompt reporting of intelligence information. Particular emphasis in intelligence training should be given to methods of operating in the enemy rear. The author stressed that all troop personnel should be trained to operate in the enemy rear. This should not be overlooked in the planning of combat training" (page 23).

The highest form of training and of testing the level of preparedness of intelligence organs and intelligence units, as well as the intelligence training of troops, are exercises and maneuvers, particularly those requiring a maneuver enemy, which makes troop training more realistic. During these exercises, the troops must be provided with all intelligence facilities which are regularly required during actual combat operations. In the course of exercises and maneuvers, training in all aspects of combat intelligence is provided, including the use of various types of surveillance devices, safeguarding military information, distribution of maps to the troops, i.e., all those activities which are handled by intelligence staff organs.

The author stresses the commander's responsibility for the intelligence organization and training. "Insufficient attention to training of intelligence personnel and incorrect use of its intelligence facilities may present a serious risk of defeat on the battlefield" (page 108).

The book by I. Maymont and works by other authors leave no doubt whatsoever that all the intelligence and subversive activities, which the American imperialists are trying to develop on the most modern scientific and technical basis, are directed mainly against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The author openly states that intelligence has acquired "special importance, since the struggle will develop between two coalitions, led by the United States and the Soviet Union" (page 101).

Therefore, it is the daily duty of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy to educate Soviet soldiers in the spirit of high vigilance.

High vigilance is inseparable from combat readiness of the troops. To be vigilant is not only to watch the intrigues of our enemies, and to guard state and military secrets, but also to be ready at all times to suppress any provocations of the imperialist aggressors.

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